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The Presidency as an Institution INONEOFthoseexquisitephrasesthatheso neatly turns, Walton Hamilton characterized the term institution as "a verbal symbol which for want of a better describes a cluster of social usages."
1 That phrase, "a cluster of social usages," serves to floodlight the concept "institution." As to the particular institution under consideration, we seem never to have neglected the presidency as a product of Constitution, statute, and judicial interpretation. But if the mythical Man from Mars were to arrive and, by some miraculous means, were to become cognizant of every clause of the Constitution, every statutory provision and every judicial judgment pertaining to the president, he would yet be woefully ignorant of the presidency as an institution.
He would lack that which vitalizes the great office, that is, the "cluster of social usages" that makes it a dynamic institution. He would know nothing of those extralegal organizations, the major political parties, which exist on a national scale, above everything else, for the purpose of electing the president and which consequently determine so largely what the presidency has been, is, and will be. He would know nothing of the national nominating conventions that emerged without preconceived design and the presidential campaigns that follow. He would lack knowledge of the inauguration and the inaugural parade, which are utterly devoid of legal validity but are none the less profoundly significant of the great institution to the nation that views the majestic spectacle from sidelines or as telecast over the national hookups. There is the president's leadership of his party and of Congress, his use of patronage, his personal charm, if any, his tours of the country, his public addresses and fireside chats. Here is but a random sampling of the usages that, in their totality, constitute some essentials of the presidency as an institution.
Walton Hamilton further observed that "institution is the singular of which mores or the folkways are the plural."
2 But these mores frequently make the transition into what the late Franklin H. Giddings denominated "stateways," that is, laws with their inevitable sanctions. This transition is what the philosopher Emerson must have meant when he wrote, "The law is only a memorandum." He might as well have said, "Here are the mores which we have reduced to writing in order that they may not be forgotten." The Constitution and even more the statutes pertaining to the presidency are, as we shall see, by and large political mores that have somehow made the transition into stateways.
It was a shrewd observation of President Grover Cleveland that "Before I can understand a political problem I have got to know how it originated." Now that we are to investigate problems of the presidency let us see how the office came about. We shall discover that it is a peculiarly American institution, that it had its genesis in embryo in the first permanent English settlement in America, the Jamestown colony in 1607.
The settlement of Jamestown was undertaken as a get-rich-quick enterprise. Elizabethan and Jacobean England was fascinated with fantastic tales of gold and silver and other resources in Virginia, where the rich hauls of Cortez and Pizarro were, they believed, about to be repeated. The London Company, a joint-stock corporation, sold stock to eager buyers in England sure of enormous dividends. The charter granted by James I was that of a commercial corporation that, of course, required a business manager, designated by the charter as governor. But since this economic enterprise was to operate in a wilderness utterly devoid of civil government, the manager was, by the terms of the charter, incidentally constituted a magistrate to enforce the laws of England in the Virginia settlement. A similar official functioned also under the later charters of the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay settlements and indeed in all the thirteen colonies.
3 The American presidency is indeed a lineal descendant of that old colonial office of governor, either a grandchild or a great-grandchild of it.
No dividends were ever declared by the London Company, and King James eventually wound up the venture by annulling the charter when the colony was only seventeen years old. But the King then appointed a royal governor of Virginia and provided him with a commission conveyed in an elaborate document including, among other things, the civil powers of governor quite as in the charter. In other colonies the letters patent, conveying the land title to proprietors such as William Penn and Lord Baltimore in Pennsylvania and Maryland, made the proprietors governors invested with powers similar to those previously mentioned in the charter colonies and the royal provinces.
In due time there were thirteen colonies, with thirteen governors, thirteen governor's councils gradually evolving into upper branches of legislatures, and thirteen popular assemblies elected by the colonists. But the royal agents, the colonial governors, were sometimes practically compelled to come, hat in hand, to the door of the colonial legislature pleading for funds for every purpose, even for their very salaries. The colonial legislature had become absolute master of the purse strings.
4 So miserable did they make the life of the governor that one American scholar has declared that the American Revolution was consummated twentyfive years before Lexington.
At any rate, when independence was achieved and the colonies had become states, the state constitutions they framed promptly reduced the governors to the "mere ciphers" that Madison denominated them in the Federalist papers.
5 So odious indeed had the colonial experience made the very title governor that four revolutionary states, in search of a decent term, designated the chief executives of their states presidents,* which title the framers of the Philadelphia Constitution serenely appropriated for the chief executive of the United States.
The intense antipathy generated against the executive in colonial times planted a persistent American prejudice against the executive. Repression of the chief executive was virtually a dogma of the Webster-Clay Whigs, and the Republican party is by no means free from it today. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the grim specter of the old colonial governor to this very day haunts the chambers of our state legislatures and the halls of our Congress. The Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution, limiting the president to two terms or sometimes little more than a term and a half, and the proposed Bricker Amendment, designed to limit the president's negotiating power in foreign relations, are only recent incantations designed to lay the ghost. There will be others.
Since the Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, had no delegated power to exact statutes, no national executive as such existed in America prior to the Constitution. It was when the framers of the Constitution provided the imposing list of legislative powers for Congress 7 that the creation of a national executive became imperative. This, however, required no stroke of inventive statesmanship but merely the appropriation and adaptation of the native American institution of the executive already 180 years old. The evidence that this is precisely what the framers did is found in one clause after another of the Philadelphia Constitution. There was no need of inventing a title for the new American chief executive when they could merely reach out and appropriate that already used for the chief executive in Delaware, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. When the framers made the president commander-in-chief, they only copied precisely what the framers of twelve of the thirteen state constitutions had already done with their chief executives. The president was given the power of pardon in imitation of the governors of nine of the states. Almost all of the states prescribed a form of the executive's oath of office, and apparently Gouverneur Morris only rephrased that of the Pennsylvania Constitution in his own incomparable style. "Not creative genius," wrote the late Professor Alexander Johnson, "but wise and discreet selection was the proper work of the Convention."
8 Verily the president of the United States was created in the image of the state governor, and he is in fact a glorified state governor.
On one item the framers failed to practice the art of statesmanship-on the method of electing the president. One can scarcely do better than quote Alexander Johnson on this matter: "The presidential electoral system was almost the only feature of the Constitution not suggested by State experience, almost the only feature that was purely artificial, not a natural growth, and democracy has ridden right over it."
9 Curiously enough the framers, early in their deliberations, had decided to have the president elected by Congress just as the governor was then elected by the legislature in most states. But this might have made the president only a bigger "cipher" than the governors.
In plain truth the Electoral College was scarcely expected to elect presidents after Washington would no longer be available. The Constitution provided that each state was to choose, in any manner that its legislature might prescribe, a number of electors equal to the total number of its senators and representatives in Congress. These electors, meeting in their respective state capitols, were to vote for any one they personally thought suitable for president and vice-president. Since formal nominations or political parties were not anticipated, the framers expected that the electoral votes would be so widely scattered among the many voted for as not to produce the majority required for election oftener than once in twenty times as delegate George Mason calculated 10 or once in fifty times as he later estimated it. So the framers provided that the real election would take place in the House of Representatives, which would ballot on only the five who stood highest in the scattered balloting of the Electoral College, with each state casting one vote.
It was the unanticipated emergence of political parties as early as the third presidential election that upset the calculations of the framers and converted the presidential electors into the automata or dummies that have transformed the Electoral College into an organ for registering, somewhat inaccurately, the popular majority. Here is the most influential one of the "cluster of social usages" constituting the institution of the presidency. Arthur W. Macmahon epitomizes the matter in his statement that "considered nationally political parties in the United States may be described as loose alliances to win the stakes of power embodied in the presidency. In our own generation the usages of the Electoral College have come to make the presidency peculiarly sensitive to minority groups concentrated largely in metropolitan centers. One of these usages that long ago became a stateway is the election of the presidential electors at large in each state, instead of by districts as they originally sometimes were. Thus in each state the election of presidential electors is, for the political parties, a game of all or none. For example, this makes it theoretically possible for the Negro vote in half a dozen big pivotal states to throw a presidential election to either party. This is true of other minorities sufficiently determined to act in concert on election day. The recent striking gains in civil rights are largely due to the balance of voting power wielded by such minority groups in the great cities of pivotal states. One need only read President Truman's veto of the TaftHartley Act to see that it was consciously designed to hold the party loyalty of a minority group, labor. The presidential elections of 1952 and 1956 only suspended the decisive functioning of these interest groups as balances of power. It was the stars in their courses that fought for General Eisenhower-the stars on his uniformquite as they had done for General Grant. Judging by his elaborate legislative programs he learned promptly the art of wooing the support of these, minority groups. The program of the welfare state stands secure. The ballots of minorities, with their balances of power functioning through the usages of the Electoral College, compel presidents and presidential candidates to play the game of outpromising each other in legislative programs. Thus they hope to capture the ballots of the minorities that collectively constitute the majorities required to elect presidents.
The letters of Washington just before he assumed the duties of the presidency reveal a deep concern as to what the public expected of him and what it would tolerate in his conduct of the new office. He was acutely aware of an utter lack of precedents for an American national chief executive.
12 He knew he would be establishing precedents, and he desired that they "may be fixed on true principles." The elaborate inaugural ceremony accompanying his taking the oath of office did not pass unchallenged. Today we generally recognize that, while the inauguration itself has no legal force, it nevertheless symbolizes the fact that the president is chief of state as well as chief executive. But to the post-Revolution purists the inauguration was a conspicuous violation of Republican simplicity and an inexcusable aping of monarchy.
The elective branch of the colonial legislature had clung to the control of finance with the tenacity of a bulldog. In this tradition Congress established the Treasury Department and required that it report directly to Congress, so that half a century later it was still being debated whether the Treasury was an executive department. Washington appointed Hamilton Secretary of the Treasury, and in accordance with the law and the requests of the House of Representatives, Hamilton made his famous reports to Congress on manufacturers and on finance and pushed through the houses his famous measures-the Hamiltonian program. What of Washington's legislative program? There was none. Hamilton, an inveterate Anglophile, immediately upon appointment had assumed that he was prime minister, even asking his friends to call him by l2 James Hart, The American Presidency in Action, 1789 Action, (1948 that title, in the tradition of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. The conduct of the government was rapidly falling into the pattern of a parliamentary system. Washington, without any conscious shirking of responsibility, was dropping into the background with a separateness suggestive of the British monarch.
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Here is a striking illustration of the extent to which the presidency is at any time a "cluster of social usages." How often has the presidency come to a parting of the ways and taken one instead of another fork of the road? As strong as the trend toward parliamentary usages then was, it promptly encountered adverse social forces so strong and deep-seated in the emerging American political culture that the trend was soon reversed.
When Washington in person first delivered to Congress what we today call the State of the Union Message, critics promptly dubbed it the Speech from the Throne. When the reply to this message was prepared by the two houses and then sent to Washington's residence to be delivered by the Vice-President, it was pronounced downright mimicking of British practice, which unquestionably it was. A year earlier Patrick Henry, speaking in the Virginia Convention that ratified the Constitution, had declared that the Constitution "squinted toward monarchy." Before Washington had been President half a dozen weeks he received a letter from a friend in Virginia who wrote that Henry's phrase, "squints toward monarchy," was in every mouth.
14 It was a dozen years later that President Jefferson, a son of the Piedmont frontier and thoroughly habituated to the American folkways, promptly ended the reign of the "monocrats," as he had dubbed the Federalists, and "put the Ship of State on its Republican tack," to use his own picturesque phrasing. By then the trend had already set in that, in the milieu of our own political mores, would transform the presidency into what Grover Cleveland was long afterward to characterize as "peculiarly the people's office."
Washington soon needed advice-an advisory council. Every colony had been provided with a governor's council, and this organ had been evolving into the upper house of the legislature, but without losing all its executive functions. Elliott's Debates on the making and ratifying of the Constitution of the United States contains nearly a dozen scattered references to the United States Senate as a "council of appointment," or a body associated with the president "to manage all our concerns with foreign nations."
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Indubitably the Senate is a legitimate child of the governor's council, and it carries to this day vestigial evidence of its ancestry. Among these vestiges are the confirmation of presidential appointees and the ratification of treaties.
Quite naturally, President Washington turned first to the Senate for his appropriate councilors. This was not strange at a time when the upper house had only twenty-two senators, two states not having yet ratified the Constitution. Washington made his first visit to the Senate chamber with a set of propositions concerning a proposed treaty with the Indians. What could be plainer than the Constitution's provision: "He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur"? Now Washington took the chair of the Senate just as the governors customarily did when conferring with their councils. Vice-President Adams read the first proposition for the treaty and turning to the senators asked, "Do you advise and consent, etc.?" The question was greeted with stony silence. Here was a momentous instant in the laboriously emerging institution of the presidency. Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania finally broke the awkward silence by asking for some of the papers pertaining to the matter and a little later urged that the matter of the treaty be referred to a committee. Thereupon, according to Maclay, Washington "started up in a violent fret and said, 'This defeats my every purpose in coming here.' " When Washington left the Senate chamber that day, he is reported to have said that he would be damned if he would ever come back there. 16 Another fork in the road to be taken had been determined. Treaties would simply have to be negotiated by the president or his agent beforehand and the draft submitted to the Senate for its consideration in his absence as is done to this day.
In the first session of Congress the Senate confirmed all Washington's appointees but one. Here was another constitutional power suggesting the intention of the framers to make the Senate a council for the president that was to sit with him while considering the nomination of an appointee. Washington's one nominee who was not confirmed was to have been collector of customs at the port of Savannah, to which nominee the Georgia senators had objected. The astonished President sent the Senate a message suggesting that, in such cases, the Senate might ascertain the president's reason for the appointment. This was ignored, and the usage, euphemistically denominated "senatorial courtesy," had begun." As a consequence it can be set down that usage has literally reversed the Constitutional provision, so that it is the Senate that virtually nominates and the president that gives consent. It was now clear that, no matter what the framers of the Constitution may have intended, the Senate simply would not serve as a council advising the president. Usage is a sovereign that can reduce a provision of the written Constitution with which it conflicts to sheer dead letters.
Washington finally got his executive council or advisory body scarcely by design but rather by accident. The Constitution, with apparently no suggestion of a council, authorized the president to require, in writing, the opinion of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective departments, and Washington was doing this as early as 1790. His first meeting with his department heads as a consultive group occurred in the third year of his presidency in order to consider what to do about the request of Congress for papers relating to St. Clair's disastrous defeat by the Indians in the Northwest Territory. The President here needed advice on a perplexing issue that had arisen, and he resorted to the expedient of calling his executive heads together. It is almost certain that he had no idea whatever of starting a new institution. It is but one more concrete illustration of the shrewd observations of the late James Bryce that "historical development is wiser than the wisest man" and "a succession of small improvements, each made conformably to existing conditions and habits, is more likely to succeed than a large scheme made all at once in what may be called the spirit of conscious experiment."
18 It is a significant fact, noted by the late George Burton Adams, that the British Cabinet system, every essential feature of which is pure usage, had matured so shortly before 1787 that the framers of our Constitution were not aware of its existence, and in fact the British Cabinet system was half a century old before its nature was sufficiently recognized that clear expositions of it as now understood were published.
1 " There was certainly no prompt recognition that a new usage had been contributed to the cluster constituting the presidency by Washington's informal conferring with his department heads collectively. Gradually, however, the term cabinet crept into the vocabulary of the newspapers and letters of the executive heads.
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By the end of Washington's eight years the term was understood. 21 By the end of Jefferson's presidency in 1809 it was a recognized institution. President Jackson was first to use the term cabinet in a presidential message. In 1907 it first appeared rather incidentally in a statute in the phrase, "the heads of the Executive Departments who are members of the President's cabinet."
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Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, could not persuade his President to hold regular Cabinet meetings. When they were held, a vote was taken on issues discussed, with Jefferson having a single vote, but he had usually persuaded the Cabinet to the point of unanimity.
23 Jackson largely ignored his executive heads as counselors and turned instead to the coterie of cronies in his famous "Kitchen Cabinet." Some presidents have abided by the majority vote of their cabinets, notably Pierce and Buchanan. Lincoln was unquestionably the master of his Cabinet. To this day we can say that the Cabinet is not yet a stabilized institution but is still evolving. As recently as December 29th, 1953, Stewart Alsop was observing that President Eisenhower "has now made the National Security Council the chief instrument of decision on matters of vital importance, that he has been presiding over it in person, and that it has thus all but replaced the unwieldy cabinet reducing the out-dated cabinet to a shadow." During the first year of the Eisenhower administration the National Security Council is said to have won presidential approval of 305 major policy decisions.
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Later Eisenhower did rather revive the Cabinet and convert it into a policy-shaping organ.
Why is the president the chief of administration? Practically all the reasons given by textbook or court opinion are not much 21 Dec. 29, 1953. more than ex-post-facto rationalizations of the fait accompli. The Constitution is not specific on the matter, apparently because the framers failed to recognize the distinct character of administrative power-that is, the "management of men and materials in accomplishing the purposes of the state," as Leonard D. White so aptly put it. 25 At any rate the Constitution is not clear as to administration, and the legislative and executive branches of the Federal government throughout our history as a nation have competed for the control of that function. They are still competing for it today. The Eisenhower administration in the beginning even removed key administrators apparently as a consequence of senatorial pressure, and under the same kind of pressure made appointments to positions where the appointee could embarrass and harass the executive branch.
The question as to the presidential control of administration depends on whether the president has the constitutional power to remove executive officers of his own volition. That question was thoroughly debated in the first session of the First Congress. A bill investing the president with this very power of removal, without requiring senatorial consent, was considered then and dropped. This disposal of the issue has been called a "legislative decision," 26 because it amounted to an interpretation that the Constitution implied the sole power of removal resided necessarily in the chief executive; he could not "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" if the Senate, by sharing the removal power, could compel him to retain subordinates he did not trust. A statute forbidding the Senate to share in removal power might have been repealed. An implication or a gentleman's understanding seemed safer.
It was Andrew Jackson who first put to test the president's power of removal as a means of control of administration. He even selected the most difficult office in the Cabinet on which to make the 25 Leonard D. White, An Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1926), p. 2.
26 James Hart, The American Presidency in Action, 1789 Action, (1948 , p. 155 ff test. In 1833 he had appointed William J. Duane Secretary of the Treasury and advised him to remove the Federal deposits of money from the Bank of the United States, the renewal of whose charter he had just recently vetoed. Now Congress had by statute specifically vested in the secretary of the treasury exclusively the discretion to remove deposits from the Bank. Duane, relying upon the statute, refused to make the removal and stood firm despite Jackson's patient but persistent attempts at persuasion. Then Jackson removed Duane and appointed in his stead Roger B. Taney, who obediently removed the deposits. Jackson justified his removal of Duane by reasoning that "upon him [the President) has been devolved by the Constitution and the suffrages of the American people the duty of superintending the operation of the Executive Departments of the Government and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed." 27 Half a century later President Hayes, even in spite of a recently enacted Tenure of Office Act by which the Senate shared in removal power, defied the Senate by removing some New York customs officers, among whom was a future president of the United States.
2 " And Grover Cleveland likewise removed a district attorney in the face of a furious senatorial protest. 28 It was only after President Wilson had removed a postmaster before the expiration of his term of appointment that the question was finally authoritatively decided in 1926 in the case of Myers v. United States.
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" The President has then the now unquestioned constitutional power to remove appointive executive officers and is consequently as much of a chief of administration as he has the competence and resolute will to be. Neither constitutional prescription nor statute has made him such, but rather over a century and a quarter of usage fortified finally by court opinion.
A (January, 1946) .
So today "upon many of our most celebrated laws the presidential imprint is clearly stamped. Each of these was drafted in the President's office, introduced and supported by his friends, defended in committee by his aides, voted through by a party over which every form of discipline and persuasion was exerted and then made law by his signature."
37 Meanwhile the president may utilize the White House breakfast with his chief supporters and even obstructionists; the fireside chat to rally constituents; the press conference to express his dismay at Congress's "dragging its feet"; the ancient lure of patronage; the threat of veto to discourage shackling amendments.
Few usages have contributed more to making the presidency what it is today than the national nominating convention. Viewed from the galleries the convention looks as meaningless as a typical sitting of the national House of Representatives. In either case the significant action is invisible from the point of disadvantage in the gallery. Of course the convention looks utterly irrational. Successful institutions, however, are not products of reason and logic but of chance and circumstances. The key to an understanding of a national convention is that it is managed by professionals, politicians who are experts in social co-operation. These experts have one great objective, namely, manipulating the delegates so as to pick a potential winner and thereby capture control of the prestige, power, and patronage embodied in the presidency. In the strategy of picking a winner the managers exercise an acumen and shrewdness impossible for the rank and file of a party functioning individually in a national party primary. Inevitably the candidate nominated will be debtor to the powerful interests that swung the nomination to him, no matter how much he may protest his freedom from commitments and usually "methinks he doth protest too much." A President who has no powerful economic, social or party forces behind him rules with a palsied hand. Such are the is * The Man in the White House realities of presidential power. For us the significant thing is that the nominating convention works, has worked for a century and a quarter, and is a faithful expression of the genius of the American people and of its folkways and mores. When we get a better nominating procedure, it will be one that emerges naturally just as the convention did; it will never be the brainchild of an inventive genius.
No interpretation of the presidency would be adequate that omitted the contributions of the great presidents to the making of the office. If we may borrow a term from the geologist, let us say that the administration of each of the great presidents has contributed its stratum of rich alluvial deposits. Washington's peculiar gift was in consequence of his superb character, which made its contribution even before he was chosen President. We have competent testimony to this fact in a letter written a year after the Philadelphia convention by Pierce Butler, one of the delegates. "Entre Nous," he wrote, "I do not believe they [the executive powers] would have been so great had not many of the members cast their eyes toward George Washington [President of the Convention], and shaped their ideas of the powers to be given the President by their opinions of his virtue." 3 * To a degree the office is what it is because it was made for Washington. In office he gave it a good start.
It was Thomas Jefferson, the third President, despite all his acquired Eastern polish still a Piedmontese frontiersman at heart, whose role it was to reorient the developing office of the presidency away from foreign precedents toward its genuinely American character. Jefferson's keen eye had appraised Europe as accurately as any American of his day who had sojourned overseas, but he saw little there to be imitated. Here was our first astute American politician-statesman, a happy son of the American political mores, resolutely determined to make the presidency a republican and an American institution. A generation later an upsurge of the American masses, "the common man," put Andrew Jackson in the White House. Speaking in the then prevailing classical vogue, his partisans proclaimed him a "tribune of the people."
39 Just as the ancient Roman tribune had shouted his "veto" into the patrician Senate in defense of his plebeian constituents, so President Jackson converted the presidential veto into an instrument for the protection of the interest of the common man. When Old Hickory retired, it was impossible to turn the hands of the clock of history back and ever again make the presidency what it had been before. His impress persists today.
Even more than Jackson, Lincoln won the hearts of common folk-Lincoln, who casually touched his hat in return to an officer's salute but uncovered his head to the man in the ranks, as Noah Brooks observed. 40 Woodrow Wilson set the modern and apparently enduring pattern of legislative leadership. The 1920's constituted an interregnum, a decade of arrested development of the presidency. The Republicans as the spiritual heirs of the preCivil War Whigs who had entrenched themselves in Congress elected three typical Republican Presidents-Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. But the spell broke suddenly on March 4, 1933, when Franklin Roosevelt seized the moment when the very disintegration of the nation seemed imminent to restore presidential leadership. When he announced, "I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require," it was apparent that another Woodrow Wilson was at the helm. At the ensuing mid-term election Republican congressmen appealed for re-election by insisting that they had supported Roosevelt's recovery legislation. In the opinion of Clinton Rossiter only Washington and Jackson did more than Franklin Roosevelt to raise the presidency "to its present condition of strength, dignity and independence." President Truman was determined that the Great Office would not be suffered to decline while he was President. It is the judgment of Rossiter that "Mr. Truman demonstrated a more cleancut philosophy of presidential power than any predecessor except Woodrow Wilson." 42 No president did his "home work" more faithfully, and none has been shrewder or more proficient in delegating authority to subordinates. Consequently, despite having dealt with one earth-rocking crises after another, he left the White House fresh and chipper without the slightest suggestion of the "hair shirt" Herbert Hoover said he wore there. "The Office he handed over to Eisenhower was no less magnificent than the Office he inherited from Roosevelt and this may well be considered a remarkable achievement."
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The twenty years' contribution of Roosevelt and Truman to the institutionalizing of the presidency left Eisenhower no choice but to accept and continue it. Thus he inherited a strong presidency. By 1953 even Republicans expected him to seize the helm resolutely and propose and promote policies, and he was far oftener criticised for inaction than action. Building upon the already welldeveloped White House staff he had inherited, Eisenhower "has done himself and the presidency a great service by carrying the process of institutionalization at least a step and a half further." 44 "Ibid., p. 123. 13 Ibid., p. 125. "Ibid., p. 131. 
